Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. (2017)
歷史背景及判決影響：
專利權耗盡(Patent Exhaustion)原則是指產品在第一次售出後，由於專利權人已取得相應的報酬，不可再對該產品向任何人主張專利權。此原則並未明定於美國專利法中，而是在判例中形成。
在本次判決之前，CAFC認可專利權人若訂定銷售後限制（Post-sale Restriction，例如在產品上註明僅供單次使用），可以使購買者在重複使用或轉售商品時（違反契約）時專利權不致耗盡（Malkinkrodt案）。雖然最高法院在 2008 年的Quenta案中闡明銷售後限制無法阻止專利權耗盡，但本案在CAFC階段被認為與Quenta案的事實不同，結果也不同（Quenta案是專利權人授權他人銷售，而本案是專利權人直接銷售）。在本案中，最高法院推翻了CAFC的先例，裁定無論是專利權人直接銷售，或是被授權人在授權範圍內銷售，都會造成耗盡。
最高法院亦說明專利權人若想行使契約中的限制，必須要通過契約法，而非專利法。這對於專利權人明顯不利，因為直接控告終端消費者違約常是不可行的，且契約法的限制遠比專利法要多。另外舉本案為例，被告不是從原告處購買碳粉匣，故兩造之間沒有契約關係(Privity of Contract)，故也不可能提告對方違約(Breach of Contract)。
此判決衝擊最大的是可重複使用的商品。例如本案中，印表機廠商向來以低價售出印表機，再從耗材獲得利潤。然而，碳粉匣是可以填充再使用的，且依舊有不錯的利潤（因為原廠的價格更高）。但類似的經營模式若套用至其他產業，則不一定有利可圖。另外像是試用品（禁止轉售？）或是給學校的特價品(僅供研究使用？)，還不確定會不會因此受影響。雖然最高法院點出「授權」與「販賣」不同，給予專利權人一線生機，導致未來美國專利權人對於海外市場可能會較傾向以授權的方式營利，而非產品的直接銷售，但可預測日後訴訟中的主戰場將會是販賣與授權之界限的討論。整體來說，在此案之後最高法院削減了專利權人的權利，對於購買了產品的消費者及第三方廠商及（例如汽車維修商）是絕對有利的。
本次判決的另一重點是美國專利由國內耗盡(Domestic Exhaustion)改為國際耗盡(Global Exhaustion)，也就是說專利權人無法再對境外售出又進口美國的商品主張專利權。此一意見翻轉了CAFC長久以來的看法（還打槍了美國政府的法庭之友意見），受到較大影響的是以低價在他國販售的商品。這些廠商或許會提高海外商品的售價，以彌補商品回流美國市場所造成的損失。許多團體已經在要求政府提供配套方案，例如設立專法來控制特定商品的進口，尤其是價差太大的產品，像是藥品（但事實上在FDA的監督之下，應不會對市場造成太大影響，除非是黑市流通的藥品）。這次的判決某種程度上降低了貿易障礙並促進了競爭。由美國進口零件，組裝後再出口至美國的國內廠商來說可更加安心。對跨國公司來說，若能稍微調整各國的訂價策略，也能減緩本案帶來的影響。
未來專利權人若要保護其產品，必須要在契約上多多斟酌，例如考慮對各種銷售渠道該有的限制，以及那些對象是有可能被帶上法院的。可確定的是，之後必然會出現不同的授權契約擬定方式，CAFC要解答諸多問題（例如說，如果本案中原告在契約中說碳粉匣是「租」給消費者，專利權是否還會耗盡？「不能轉售的販售」與「不能轉售的授權」，實質上的差異在哪？將銷售包裝成授權，法院就會買單嗎？）。
判決重點：
- 當產品售出時，專利權就已經耗盡，無論專利權人是否聲稱有任何銷售後限制(post-sale restrictions)。1
- 當被授權者按照授權合約進行銷售，就如同專利權人直接銷售，專利權同樣耗盡。2
- 確立國際耗盡的原則。1
本案歷程：
Lexmark生產並販售印表機及碳粉匣，而一些第三方廠商則專門填充使用過的碳粉匣，並以較低廉的價格提供給消費者。Lexmark的對策是向消費者提供折扣後的碳粉匣（稱為Return Program），但契約中載明此種碳粉匣只能單次使用，且用完的碳粉匣只能交由Lexmark回收（碳粉匣中有防止再次使用的晶片）。
然而，被告Impression依然繼續填充Lexmark的空碳粉匣（採購自世界各地），填充後再出售給美國的消費者。其中還包括被Impression破解晶片的Return Program碳粉匣。Lexmark在 2010 提出專利訴訟。
Lexmark控告的產品有兩類：
- 透過Return Program販售，但被Impression翻新(refurbish)或轉售(resell)的碳粉匣（Lexmark已禁止購買者重複使用或販售）。
- 在境外販售，但被Impression進口至美國的碳粉匣（Lexmark並未授權Impression進口）。
Impression則認為兩種產品都已經專利權耗盡，而地院同意國內販售的碳粉匣已耗盡，但境外販售的則否（國內耗盡原則）。本案經上訴後，CAFC做出對Lexmark有利的判決（兩種產品皆未耗盡）。
CAFC的論點是：(en banc，但有兩位法官不同意)
- 專利權人在販賣產品時，可以經由主張售後使用(post-sale use)或轉售(resale)限制，而保留提告專利侵權的權力。由於被告已合法這些限制，故專利權並未耗盡。CAFC認為General Talking Pictures一案中已確立若授權時已有清楚表明對購買者（向被授權者購買產品之人）有銷售後的限制，則當購買者違反這些限制時，專利權人可以對購買者提告專利侵權。因此，若禁止專利權人於「銷售」時保留部分權利，則與「授權」的先前判例失去一致性。3
- 如同已確立的判決先例，專利權人在境外販售的產品，不會造成專利權耗盡。
最高法院不同意CAFC的看法，理由如下：
專利權耗盡原則的功能就是用來限制專利權的行使。因此，在詮釋專利權耗盡的理論時並不需要考慮專利侵權的法理。就算專利權人經由契約限制購買者使用或轉售商品，此限制也只能在契約法下執行，而非專利法。4
專利權耗盡的規定體現了判例法( Common Law)中的「禁止限制財產轉讓」(against restraints on alienation)原則。專利法是為了要給予發明人應有的獎勵，當產品售出時，專利權人就已經獲得了這些獎勵，此後專利法就沒有拘束該產品的基礎。若是允許進一步的限制，就會與前述規則相牴觸（最高法院在此引述了Kirtsaeng案，但這其實是與著作權相關的判例）。另外，就算專利權人在銷售時附帶了明確的限制，依Quanta案的見解，專利權人也不保有該產品的專利權。5
CAFC錯誤地將專利權耗盡視為專利侵權法理的一種詮釋，而因為專利侵權需要考慮系爭產品是否未經許可(without authority)，所以當專利權人藉由加上限制(restriction)保留部分的許可時，就可以透過專利侵權主張這些限制。然而，專利權耗盡並不是前述許可的一種推測，而是專利權範圍的一道界線。購買者可以任意使用商品不是因為獲得的專利權人的許可，而是因為取得了商品的所有權。6
對於CAFC判決中「販售」與「授權」的類比，多數意見認為兩者是有差別的，因為授權並非一種轉讓行為，不會與禁止限制財產轉讓規則產生牴觸。換句話說，販售是財產的轉移，而授權是權利的轉移。7
就算授權合約中有銷售後限制，也不代表專利權人可以透過專利法對購買者施加此些限制。若被授權者在販售時有遵循授權合約，專利權人事實上就等於同意了此銷售，而專利權也就耗盡了。就算購買者並未遵守這些限制，被授權者也只能依契約法求償（等同專利權人自行販售）。8
General Talking Pictures一案的情形完全不同，因為在該案中被授權者是在授權範圍之外進行販售，等於沒有經過授權，故專利權人自然可以對被授權者及購買者提告專利侵權。然而專利權人能夠向購買者提告僅是因為購買者參與了被授權者的侵權行為。9
- 智慧財產權的國際耗盡是濫觴於著作權法。更精確的說，是 17 U. S. C. §109(a)中的「第一次銷售原則」(First Sale Doctrine)。Kirtsaeng一案中認為第一次銷售原則不限於地理位置，因為此原則是根基於禁止限制財產轉讓規則的法理。同樣的，在專利法中也看不出國會有意將專利權耗盡侷限於國內。最高法院強調專利法與著作權法的目的十分相似，且許多產品同時受到專利及著作權的保護。10 雖然Lexmark主張國外銷售之產品無法被美國專利保護，因而不能以與美國相同的價格售出，但法官認為售價是專利權人自己決定的，且專利法從未保證產品的售價。重點是，專利法是要確保專利權人獲得「一次」獎勵。最終，最高法院評論了美國政府在amicus中的論點：美國境外的銷售會造專利權耗盡，「除非」專利權人清楚地保留了這些權利（Express-Reservation Rule，暗示權利是可以保留的）。多數意見認為此見解僅是政策，而非原則，雖然CAFC在Jazz Photo案中採用了此原則，但仍缺乏具一致性的判例。因此，專利權耗盡與任何限制或地理位置無關，重點在於專利權人決定將商品售出。11
不同意見書：Ginsburg法官不同意國際耗盡的論點。Ginsburg認為專利是屬地主義，既然在美國境外之銷售不受美國專利法所管轄，如何可因此耗盡了在美國的專利權？對於Kirtsaeng案與專利權耗盡的類比，他則認為專利法中並沒有著作權法 17 U.S. Code § 109(a)的對應法條，且著作權保護是已經全球調和的，而專利保護則否。12
若要用一句話總結本案，那就是「當專利權人售出產品，專利權就已耗盡，購買者及之後的擁有者不必再擔心專利侵權」。（爭點僅在於專利權人是否售出產品或授權他人售出產品）
“We conclude that a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of its patent rights in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee purports to impose or the location of the sale.”
“In sum, patent exhaustion is uniform and automatic. Once a patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—that sale exhausts its patent rights,regardless of any post-sale restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either directly or through a license.”
“our decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U. S. 175, aff ’d on reh’g, 305 U. S. 124 (1938), established that—when a patentee grants a license “under clearly stated restrictions on post-sale activities” of those who purchase products from the licensee—the patentee can also sue for infringement those purchasers who knowingly violate the restrictions. 816 F. 3d, at 743–744. If patentees can employ licenses to impose post-sale restrictions on purchasers that are enforceable through infringement suits, the court concluded, it would make little sense to prevent patentees from doing so when they sell directly to consumers.”
“For over 160 years, the doctrine of patent exhaustion has imposed a limit on that right to exclude: When a patentee sells an item, that product “is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly” and instead becomes the “private, individual property” of the purchaser. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549–550. ”If the patentee negotiates a contract restricting the purchaser’s right to use or resell the item, it may be able to enforce that restriction as a matter of contract law, but may not do so through a patent infringement lawsuit.”
“The exhaustion rule marks the point where patent rights yield to the common law principle against restraints on alienation. The Patent Act promotes innovation by allowing inventors to secure the financial rewards for their inventions. Once a patentee sells an item, it has secured that reward, and the patent laws provide no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the product. Allowing further restrictions would run afoul of the “common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels.” Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. 519, 538. As Lord Coke put it in the 17th century, if an owner restricts the resale or use of an item after selling it, that restriction “is voide, because . . . it is against Trade and Traffique, and bargaining and contracting betweene man and man.” 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England §360, p. 223 (1628). Congress enacted and has repeatedly revised the Patent Act against the backdrop of this hostility toward restraints on alienation, which is reflected in the exhaustion doctrine. This Court accordingly has long held that, even when a patentee sells an item under an express, otherwise lawful restriction, the patentee does not retain patent rights in that product. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U. S. 617. And that wellsettled line of precedent allows for only one answer in this case: Lexmark cannot bring a patent infringement suit against Impression Products with respect to the Return Program cartridges sold in the United States because, once Lexmark sold those cartridges, it exhausted its right to control them through the patent laws. Pp. 5–9.”
“The Federal Circuit reached a different result because it started from the premise that the exhaustion doctrine is an interpretation of the patent infringement statute, which prohibits anyone from using or selling a patented article “without authority” from the patentee. According to the Federal Circuit, exhaustion reflects a default rule that selling an item “presumptively grant[s] ‘authority’ for the purchaser to use it and resell it.” 816 F. 3d 721, 742. But if a patentee withholds some authority by expressly limiting the purchaser’s rights, the patentee may enforce that restriction through patent infringement lawsuits. See id., at 741. The problem with the Federal Circuit’s logic is that the exhaustion doctrine is not a presumption about the authority that comes along with a sale; it is a limit on the scope of the patentee’s rights. The Patent Act gives patentees a limited exclusionary power, and exhaustion extinguishes that power. A purchaser has the right to use, sell, or import an item because those are the rights that come along with ownership, not because it purchased authority to engage in those practices from the patentee. Pp. 9–13.”
“A patentee can impose restrictions on licensees because a license does not implicate the same concerns about restraints on alienation as a sale. Patent exhaustion reflects the principle that, when an item passes into commerce, it should not be shaded by a legal cloud on title as it moves through the marketplace. But a license is not about passing title to a product, it is about changing the contours of the patentee’s monopoly: The patentee agrees not to exclude a licensee from making or selling the patented invention, expanding the club of authorized producers and sellers. See General Elec. Co., 272 U. S., at 489–490. Because the patentee is exchanging rights, not goods, it is free to relinquish only a portion of its bundle of patent protections. ”
“A patentee’s authority to limit licensees does not, as the Federal Circuit thought, mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restrictions on purchasers that are enforceable through the patent laws. So long as a licensee complies with the license when selling an item, the patentee has, in effect, authorized the sale. That licensee’s sale is treated, for purposes of patent exhaustion, as if the patentee made the sale itself. The result: The sale exhausts the patentee’s rights in that item. See Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U. S. 355, 362–363 (1893). A license may require the licensee to impose a restriction on purchasers, like the license limiting the computer manufacturer to selling for non-commercial use by individuals. But if the licensee does so—by, perhaps, having each customer sign a contract promising not to use the computers in business—the sale nonetheless exhausts all patent rights in the item sold. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 506–507, 516 (1917). The purchasers might not comply with the restriction, but the only recourse for the licensee is through contract law, just as if the patentee itself sold the item with a restriction. ”
“General Talking Pictures involved a fundamentally different situation: There, a licensee “knowingly ma[de] . . . sales . . . outside the scope of its license.” 304 U. S., at 181–182 (emphasis added). We treated the sale “as if no license whatsoever had been granted” by the patentee, which meant that the patentee could sue both the licensee and the purchaser—who knew about the breach—for infringement. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U. S. 124, 127 (1938). This does not mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restraints on purchasers. Quite the contrary: The licensee infringed the patentee’s rights because it did not comply with the terms of its license, and the patentee could bring a patent suit against the purchaser only because the purchaser participated in the licensee’s infringement. General Talking Pictures, then, stands for the modest principle that, if a patentee has not given authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the patentee’s rights.
In sum, patent exhaustion is uniform and automatic. Once a patentee decides to sell—whether on its own or through a licensee—that sale exhausts its patent rights, regardless of any post-sale restrictions the patentee purports to impose, either directly or through a license. ”
“The question about international exhaustion of intellectual property rights has arisen in the context of copyright law. Under the first sale doctrine, when a copyright owner sells a lawfully made copy of its work, it loses the power to restrict the purchaser’s right “to sell or otherwise dispose of . . . that copy.” 17 U. S. C. §109(a). In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. 519, this Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to copies of works made and sold abroad. Central to that decision was the fact that the first sale doctrine has its roots in the common law principle against restraints on alienation. Because that principle makes no geographical distinctions and the text of the Copyright Act did not provide such a distinction, a straightforward application of the first sale doctrine required concluding that it applies overseas.
Applying patent exhaustion to foreign sales is just as straightforward. Patent exhaustion, too, has its roots in the antipathy toward restraints on alienation, and nothing in the Patent Act shows that Congress intended to confine that principle to domestic sales. Differentiating between the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines would also make little theoretical or practical sense: The two share a “strong similarity . . . and identity of purpose,” Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 13, and many everyday products are subject to both patent and copyright protections. ”
“Finally, the United States, as an amicus, advocates what it views as a middle-ground position: that “a foreign sale authorized by the U. S. patentee exhausts U. S. patent rights unless those rights are expressly reserved.” Brief for United States 7–8. Its position is largely based on policy rather than principle. The Government thinks that an overseas “buyer’s legitimate expectation” is that a “sale conveys all of the seller’s interest in the patented article,” so the presumption should be that a foreign sale triggers exhaustion. Id., at 32–33. But, at the same time, “lower courts long ago coalesced around” the rule that “a patentee’s express reservation of U. S. patent rights at the time of a foreign sale will be given effect,” so that option should remain open to the patentee. Id., at 22 (emphasis deleted).
The Government has little more than “long ago” on its side. In the 1890s, two circuit courts—in cases involving the same company—did hold that patentees may use express restrictions to reserve their patent rights in connection with foreign sales. See Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 F. 192, 194–195 (CA8 1897); Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524, 527 (CA2 1893). But no “coalesc[ing]” ever took place: Over the following hundred-plus years, only a smattering of lower court decisions mentioned this expressreservation rule for foreign sales. See, e.g., Sanofi, S. A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 938 (NJ 1983). And in 2001, the Federal Circuit adopted its blanket rule that foreign sales do not trigger exhaustion, even if the patentee fails to expressly reserve its rights. Jazz Photo, 264 F. 3d, at 1105. These sparse and inconsistent decisions provide no basis for any expectation, let alone a settled one, that patentees can reserve patent rights when they sell abroad.
The theory behind the Government’s expressreservation rule also wrongly focuses on the likely expectations of the patentee and purchaser during a sale. Exhaustion does not arise because of the parties’ expectations about how sales transfer patent rights. More is at stake when it comes to patents than simply the dealings between the parties, which can be addressed through contract law. Instead, exhaustion occurs because, in a sale, the patentee elects to give up title to an item in exchange for payment. Allowing patent rights to stick remora-like to that item as it flows through the market would violate the principle against restraints on alienation. Exhaustion does not depend on whether the patentee receives a premium for selling in the United States, or the type of rights that buyers expect to receive. As a result, restrictions and location are irrelevant; what matters is the patentee’s decision to make a sale. ”
“[t]he Patent Act contains no analogue to 17 U.S.C. §109(a), the Copyright Act first-sale provision analyzed in Kirtsaeng. More importantly, copyright protections, unlike patent protections, are harmonized across countries.”
“When a patentee sells one of its products, however, the patentee can no longer control that item through the patent laws—its patent rights are said to “exhaust.” The purchaser and all subsequent owners are free to use or resell the product just like any other item of personal property, without fear of an infringement lawsuit.“